[PLUG-TALK] Re: Re: Omniscience vs. Freewill

glen e. p. ropella gepr at tempusdictum.com
Fri Apr 15 00:40:49 UTC 2005


=><=><= "kl" == Keith Lofstrom <keithl at kl-ic.com> writes:

kl> The capital-free but heavily-initialled glen e. p. ropella writes:

Hey, now... I may not be wealthy... But, I have some capital.

kl> Point 1) Of course it is a model.  We are discussing models, and models
kl> only (reality is hard to render in ASCII).  Determinism is a model. 
kl> Omniscience is a feature of a model.  What we can do is compare models,
kl> and show that two models that cannot be mapped to each other are
kl> contradictory.  A theory is a way of relating models - the theory of
kl> gravity relates a mathematical model to an observational model of
kl> moving bodies, for example.  Relativity relates more sophisticated
kl> mathematics to more sophisticated observations.  Glen, as you noted
kl> to Russ, the weak description of two models (robot world, and
kl> omniscient God) do not automatically result in a consistent theory
kl> relating them.  

No fundamental disagreement there!  (There are nits... but they don't
need to be picked right now.)

kl> Point 2) The QM model can be applied to many macroscopic observations.
kl> My background is semiconductors and superconductors, and many of the
kl> effects we see are rooted in behavior most concisely described within
kl> the QM model.  That said, I am specifically thinking in this context
kl> of "integration over paths", a common (but very difficult) operation
kl> used in particle physics to accurately measure the behavior of systems.
kl> The photon goes through slit A, AND through slit B, and around the
kl> edge of the experiment, and three loops around Alpha Centauri, and
kl> you can compute a probability for all of the maybes (very small for
kl> Alpha Centauri) and sum them together and see what they add up to. 
kl> For larger systems, the calculations usually average out to a single high
kl> probability state, so we can usually dispense with the complicated
kl> math.  But researchers are now constructing macroscopic systems where
kl> this is not the case, and multiple moderate probability outcomes may
kl> occur.

OK.  This is an understandable progression.  But, I still think it's
faulty, at least in this conversation about metaphysics and what QM
means metaphysically.  There are strong arguments I can make, here,
specifically regarding the "sum" you refer to.  But, since you would
like to emphasize your engineer characteristics, I'd rather back off a
bit and talk about practicalities.

QM is _not_ and will never be used, at least in its current form, for
large systems like human bodies, planets, solar systems, etc.  It is
inefficient (if not infeasible) to do so.  So, even _if_, for example,
a basketball or an airplane has a non-zero width to its position and
some experiment can be devised to _prove_ this, the QM will _not_ be
used to calculate (predict, estimate, determine, etc.)  where the
basketball or airplane will be from one time to another.

So, from an engineering perspective, QM is not a very good _model_ of 
the world because it's not a _useful_ model of the world.

kl> Quantum computing is one such attempt at such a system.  
kl> There are some conjectures about the brain that suggest that the
kl> brain itself may be such a QM amplifier (I think Penrose says that),
kl> but lacking both detailed mathematical/logical models of the brain,
kl> or precise observations, such conjectures cannot be elevated to
kl> a hypothesis, much less a theory.  Neither can such conjectures be
kl> ruled out (for now) by the inadequate models or measurements we have.

Granted, because we have devices (_devices_) that behave in certain 
ways, we can insert those devices into other, larger, devices and 
the composite device can behave in ways that are dependent on their
components.  That's pretty obvious, I think.

So, the ordered-water in the microtubules of our brain, because they
behave in a certain way, can cause our brain, the composite in which
the microtubules sit, to behave in certain ways.  The same is true of
wacky computing devices.

But, that _doesn't_ mean that QM is true.  It only means that QM is
sufficient for describing and specifying some devices that can be 
plugged into other devices.

Note that I'm not claiming that QM is _not_ true, here.  I'm claiming
that just because it works doesn't make it true.

And, since you brought it up as evidence that Determinism is false
(or... uh ... "shredded" ;-), it's important to note that QM, as a
model, cannot show that.  You admit that later in this email... So,
I'm just repeating it for emphasis.

[...]
kl> With QM and nonlinear amplification (if you prefer that label to
kl> "chaos"), we can show that a complete observational model of the
kl> universe in one state - any slice through N dimensional space-time
kl> - cannot completely predict any other slice.  With a deterministic
kl> model, you could precisely connect the states.

Not true.  I agree that "any slice of the universe cannoth be
predicted from any other slice".  (Great way to say it BTW!)  I
disagree that a determinstic model would allow you to precisely
connect the states.  We'll cover that more later where you point out
that I may be using a different definition of "determinism".

kl> Still, the paths
kl> usually converge.  So while some amplified quantum effect may make
kl> the next word flabutanically unpredictable, we converge to the same
kl> high-probability period at the end of the sentence.  

This statement could be used equally for determinism as for
predictability.  So, it sounds like you're "negotiating with
yourself"... And George W. Bush recommends against that.

kl> Or not,

kl> All the paths are there in some sense, there are no "other universes". 

I'm torn whether or not to let you get away with such statements.
We don't know that and we can't prove it.  It's metaphysical.

kl> As a side note, and relating this roughly to computers, we are well
kl> on the way towards computers where indeterminism will be an important
kl> constraint in their design and operation.  In other words, on the
kl> Pentium 14 processor of the year 2020, you can repeat same 1000
kl> instruction sequence and end up in two different states.  Making
kl> such computers converge on a usable result, cost effectively, will
kl> be a challenge for computer science - and put all the determinists
kl> out of work.  This stuff does have real consequences.

But, again, from an engineering perspective, we _already_ have to use
estimation theory for any real-world calculation.  So, inaccuracies
like this won't bother industry very much... They'll drive the
academics batty, of course.

>> All the garbage about how QM relates to philosophies like Determinism
>> is just a bunch of meta-physical hooey.  You might as well be arguing
>> about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.

kl> I can't refute a sneer.  As you (correctly) demanded from Russ, could
kl> you put some traction on those rather unbecoming statements?

Sorry.  I didn't intend to sneer.  I'm just making the statement
that physical theories like QM don't really say much at all about
reality.  They are meta-physical... i.e. beyond the capabilities
or considerations of physics... Supernatural, if you will.  Determinism
is a statement about the supernatural world.  QM is a statement about
the natural world.

Metaphysics is fun!  Don't take me the wrong way.  But, in the end,
our opinions are left up to intuition and affinity.  The falsification
process of Bacon or Popper can't really establish that one
metaphysical concept is better than another.

>> Granted, QM is the single most successful scientific theory we 
>> monkeys have developed to date.  But, that doesn't mean it's true.
>> As you so vividly point out, we're wrong about alot of things alot
>> of the time.  I would bet my soul that we're wrong about QM, too.

kl> Wrong in what sense?  Of course we will find more sophisticated
kl> mathematics, and make more sophisticated observations.  But what
kl> we have works for most of the observations we can make, even for
kl> cosmological questions that I would have never thought related.
kl> There are still numerous cosmological questions that we cannot
kl> measure or map onto mathematics, so it is premature to claim that
kl> QM does or doesn't apply there.  And QM is certainly a real bastard
kl> to calculate with - Occam is dying of a million cuts here - so a
kl> more calculable model is desperately wanted.

I'm glad you brought up Occam.  Occam's isn't a law, it's a method.  A
good one, to be sure.  But, in many cases like our particle zoo or
biology and medicine, in general, it isn't as applicable as we'd like.

I really don't know how QM is wrong.  I just know that it's a model
and a model cannot be a good _model_ if it is identical to its
referent.  The most vivid example of this would be the following:
Imagine the state of Oregon.  Now imagine a map of Oregon.  Now
imagine that the map was complete... really complete.  It contains
every single detail of the real Oregon, including instantaneous,
real-time updates mapping where all the people, animals, insects, and
molecules are at any given time.... Well, as a _map_ it wouldn't be
very useful. [grin] It's accurate... and precise... But, as a model of
its referent, there's no point to it.  Why study the map when it's
just as difficult as studying the referent directly?

So, QM, as a model, cannot be true.  If it were, it wouldn't give 
us _any_ facility over manipulating reality than we could get without
it.  And QM _is_ very useful.

Now, QM is likely the truest model we have... At the very least, it's
pretty damn confusing... just like reality.  And it's pretty
complicated...  just like reality.  So, it's arguably one of the truest
theories out there from that perspective.  But, it's not true.

kl> However, I have a sick feeling that more accurate, inclusive models
kl> will be beyond the capabilities of unaugmented "monkey" brains.  The
kl> really sick feeling is that even with augmentation we won't get there,
kl> and HAL9000 will just say "you fleshboys will *never* understand it"
kl> and leave us all in the dust.  I'm hoping for 'augment'.

I agree completely, here.  Cybernetics is still a young discipline.

>> Now, you glibly drop a few references to G?del, chaos theory, and some
>> unnamed set of other things that supposedly demonstrate that
>> Determinism (another bit of metaphysics) is false.  And, this is
>> hooey, too, not for the least reason that one cannot _disprove_
>> metaphysical philosophies.  (enough negatives for you? ;-)

kl> You are very determined about indeterminate determinism.  Ow, my
kl> head hurts just writing that.  I cannot prove that determinism
kl> is FALSE.  That takes something outside the system.  As you just
kl> said, and go on to say in a different way.  All I can do is argue
kl> observations and probabilities, and then engineer from it. 
kl> Determinism may be TRUE somewhere out there in lala land, but
kl> it makes for lousy predictivity and results in lousy design.

I couldn't have said it any better myself.

kl> The 100 page paper ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Tarski ) is
kl> "tidy little?"  Perhaps you are referring to a summary.  If you are
kl> referring to the full paper, it appeared in the collection "Logic,
kl> Semantics, and Meta-Mathematics" which I can spend $24 on if you think
kl> it is important.  Otherwise, point me at the summary and we can argue
kl> from equipotential ignorance.

I've got the one in "Logic, Semantics, ...".  It really is worth the
read.  Not the whole book... just the "Truth in Formalized Languages"
part.  Powells has a copy, now.  I just got the notification the other
day.

kl> Note, however, that I am an engineer.  I use theories to get things
kl> done, to map models onto "stuff" and vice-versa.  So far, I have
kl> found that THE TRUTH is a useless hypothesis for this task.  Still,
kl> it is an important hypothesis to some folks, so I will check it out.

You'll like what Tarski did.  He tries to be a good Hilbertian formalist
and succeeds in some cases and fails in others.  The failure lead to 
him independently proving Gödel's theorem.

>> As for chaos theory, it, like G?del's theorem, is an artifact of our
>> _mathematics_.  Mathematics is thought... monkey thought, to be
>> specific.  [grin] Chaos theory demonstrates certain consequences that
>> ensue from our mathematical infrastructure.  That's all it is.  It
>> says nothing about truth, God, or the philosophy of Determinism.

kl> No, "chaos theory" relates observations of systems to the mathematics of
kl> nonlinear amplification.  I used to design and build Analog to Digital
kl> Converters, a type of circuit prone to a phenomena called metastability. 
kl> That is, if the voltage into the converter is at 11.5000, it can take a
kl> very long time to resolve to 11 or to 12.  Yes, thermal noise can change
kl> the resolution path, as can quantum effects, but the result is still that
kl> you better not do anything irrevocable (like converting the result to
kl> 1011 or 1100) with the information before it has had sufficent time to
kl> resolve.  If you try to prematurely resolve the result, you may end up
kl> with 1000 or 1111 or 1001 or 1110 out of the converter (a "sparkle code"
kl> if you are converting video).  I used chaos theory to prove to colleagues
kl> that this or that design of theirs did not bypass the problem.  (BTW,
kl> the trick is to measure with something called "gray code" and convert
kl> to binary after pipelining it through multiple stages of non-destructive
kl> XOR logic - which Tektronix turned into US Patent 5,459,466 six years
kl> after I left [and couldn't prevent] ).  Sure, "chaos theory" can be
kl> used for metaphysics, but I use it in engineering.  Paint me wierd.

I'm not sure what you're saying "No" to...  And I don't have much to 
argue about with what you say in this paragraph.  But, there is a nit
I have to pick.

You did _not_ "prove to colleagues that this or that design of theirs
did not bypass the problem."  [grin]  Imagine my arrogance at pretending
to know what you did or did not prove. ... Oh well, I am what I am.

What you did was _beat_ them with rhetoric.  Your rhetoric was better
than theirs... or they were incapable of finding holes in it.  That's
a _good_ thing.  Unfortunately, the word "rhetoric" has taken on this
negative connotation of "specious argument"... But, that's not what it
means at all.  I aplaud you on your use of chaos theory in that
context...  Very cool.

>> But, if you _insist_ on haggling on this point, the mathematics of
>> chaos theory IS deterministic.  Chaos theory supports a deterministic
>> (but unpredictable... with the calculus, anyway) view of dynamical
>> systems.  So, chaos theory argues that even if the universe were a
>> huge system of partial differential equations, for example, it might
>> be unpredictable but it is definitely deterministic.

kl> I guess we differ on the definition of deterministic, then.  I connect
kl> it to the verb "determine", which implies an actor and two subjects
kl> (a predictive mental construct, and observations to describe).  You 
kl> seem to be implying a weaker definition like "mathematically describable"
kl> or "partitionable result set".

I use it in the sense of "what is will remain so", which I think
follows the original intend of this thread.  The meaning is more at
"fixed", "unambiguous", and "unalterable".  To _determine_ something
is used colloquially to mean "found out what is" and "forcibly fixed".
Plug those two together and you get the philosophical orientation that
talks about an all-knowing being knowing all about things that haven't
happened, yet.

But, prediction has a tighter focus on time.  Literally, it means "to
state in advance".  A process need not be determinate for some prophet
to predict the state of that process in the future.  And a determinate
process need not be predictable.

kl> The problem is that the human actor turns
kl> predictions into other outcomes (that rock is falling, I'd better move!)
kl> with cascading effects that are very difficult to model.  People
kl> "determine", then they act, then their actions have consequences,
kl> usually mingling with the outcome predicted.  The result is a furball of
kl> events that render many human predictive models useless.  Maybe God's
kl> models are rendered useless, too (I'm cheating, today is an "atheist" day).

Again, I agree with you.  But, here's where the previous mention of a 
"summing" process comes in.  This cascade or causal/inferential chain
that you refer to is a result of abstraction, I think.  When you say
that "people 'determine'", what you mean is that they "form an opinion"
or a "gestalt" or a "plan of action" or whatever.  If Penrose is right,
then _perhaps_ that large-system objective reduction of the entangled 
smear of the ordered water in the microtubules collapses and causes 
a person's mind to be made up.  Then all the events after that collapse
are determined.

But, that doesn't make them any more predictable, in part because
other people's minds some distance away might not have collapsed, yet.
So, the fuzziness never goes away... the fuzziness just percolates
throughout the universe where there are these indeterminate regions.

But, even in that scenario, we can't say that QM invalidates
determinism as a philosophy, especially when you throw something as
ill-defined as "God" into the discussion.

kl> Freedom increases the unpredictability - more actors can make more
kl> models and affect more stuff.  That is why determinism survives as
kl> a concept - it permits the insecure to shackle others without feeling
kl> too bad about it.  Observe the purveyors of of determinism, and the
kl> things they demand of others, and you will find this is a pretty good
kl> theory (not perfectly determinative, of course).  The determinists
kl> want to increase predictability because they are not very adaptable,
kl> and want to increase their relative advantage at the expense of others. 
kl> Straightforward monkey politics.  Can't prove it, but it works for me.

I don't really agree with this.  I think determinism survives for the
same reason reductionism survives... because it works in some circles
or in some domains.  Whether it only works on weak minded people or
not, I don't know.  But, I know alot of people way smarter than me who
believe in both determinism and reductionism.... So, I'm agnostic on
this one.

kl> One thing I can say for sure is that the appearance of the human mind
kl> made the world  become quite unpredictable - we can make better theories
kl> about the last billion years than we can about the next hundred.  That
kl> observation alone should render highly suspect any mechanistic models
kl> of human mentation.

So true!  Yet mechanism and the mechanistic universe is a dream of
many.  And, to be fair, we shouldn't just give up.  I rather _like_
knowing (or having a good guess) at certain causal chains.  Even if
the causal chains I "know" aren't true, it helps me temporarily move
on to thinking and working on other things once I've settled on one.
In this sense, things like determinism and reductionism may just be
another evolutionary strategy for staying alive.  You can't run very
fast when you're hyper-analyzing the leopard's spots.

>> [grin] Shame on you for wielding these weapons so irresponsibly!  I
>> charge you to slay a calf at the alter of G?del (make sure you burn
>> it... you know how paranoid he is) and iterate 12 fractals in the
>> temple of Lorenz!

kl> Howzabout I sleigh the calf at the altar?  I don't kill calves, but
kl> I will use them to get around!  And I am more attracted to Lorentz
kl> than Lorenz, though you have to c 1 to know 1.  

OK.  I suppose it is a bit unethical to murder animals just to worship
a dead mathematician.  But, you still have to iterate the rosary.
Well, I was referring to Edward Lorenz... Is there a controversy over
how to spell Lorenz?  Isn't Edward the guy who did the weather
modeling and such?  Anyway, that's the guy who gave a lecture at my
college when I was an undergrad.  I just presumed it would be his 
temple, you'd have to do the IFS rosary at.

kl> glen, it is always a pleasure.  Between the two of us, we make a
kl> whole wit ...

Same to you.  I frequently LOL at your emails.  I'm not so sure about
the wit thing, though... Does two half-wits add up to a wit?  I can 
only imagine Laurel and Hardy, here.

-- 
glen e. p. ropella              =><=                           Hail Eris!
H: 503.630.4505                              http://www.ropella.net/~gepr
M: 971.219.3846                               http://www.tempusdictum.com




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