Omniscience vs. Freewill (was Re: [PLUG-TALK] Re: PLUG-talk Digest, Vol 7, Issue 6)

[glen e. p. ropella]

=><=><= "rj" == Russ Johnson <russj at dimstar.net> writes:

>> No.  That's not the case.  Why do you keep repeating yourself?
>> 
rj> Uhm, maybe you are too.

I don't think so.  I've tried to state different aspects of the
argument each of the three times.  In this message, you actually
make some counter-arguments to the points I've made.  So, thanks.

>> I'll try again... Last time.  Freewill is a time-dependent concept.
>> In order to have and participate in _indeterminate_ decision making,
>> you must be a time-dependent process.  If you have options for what
>> _will_ happen in the future, then you have freewill.
>> 
>> 
rj> The only way that could happen is if this omniscient being could see all 
rj> possible timelines, all at once. Otherwise, there's only one timeline, 
rj> and I have to follow said timeline, and my choices are predetermined.

rj> As I've stated previously, I don't think that theory holds water. I 
rj> don't believe there are multiple timelines. Multiple timelines is a cop 
rj> out.

rj> I could have the illusion of decision making, but if God can see my 
rj> whole life then my decisions have been made already. From His 
rj> perspective. Oh what a boring existance that would be, since He already 
rj> knows what my life will be like.

OK.  First, it doesn't matter what you believe.  So, stating that is
like saying "I believe in God."  Who cares?  The point is that you 
are trying to prove that God's omniscience contradicts man's freewill.
I'm trying to demonstrate that you haven't proved that.  None of that
depends on what you believe.

Now.  Re: freewill as an illusion.  This is a good counter argument
to my point that time-dependence is fundamental.  Here's my response
to freewill as an illusion.

Imagine that the universe is stochastic, meaning that some events are
unexplainable (random, unpredictable, whatever)... not just
unexplainable to a simpleton human... but truly unexplainable by God
or anyone else.

So, we have a process that chunks through this universe.  Also, let's
say that some being (human or God) can percieve, completely, the state
of the universe at any given time or any given time window.  Then
let's say at time t_i one of these unexplainable events occurs,
changing the state of the universe in an unpredictable way.

This being measures the state of the universe at time t_(i-1) and
at time t_i and, therefore knows everything about the state of the
universe.  The being knows _everything_ there is to know.  That being
is omniscient.

You might retort: "But, that being can't explain the unexplainable
cause of these unexplainable events!  So, therefore, it doesn't know
everything!"  But, that is a non sequitur.  The being knows everything
there is to _know_.  So, it is omniscient.  Omniscient is about
knowledge.  If you know everything there is to know, then you know
all.

The fact that this being can examine the state of the universe
completely and at any given time (it is space and time independent),
allows it to be all-knowing.

rj> It makes no difference if God is timeless or not. The fact remains that 
rj> if God can see the whole of my lifetime, and I can't make changes to 
rj> what he sees, then free-will is non-existant.

The time-independence _is_ crucial for the above reasons.  God can see
the whole of your lifetime, including any random events or events you
decided/decide/will decide to make.  He can do this because all he has
to do is look at the universe at time t_(pre-Russ) and t_(during-Russ)
and t_(post-Russ).  Any decisions you make in the t_(post-Russ) -
t_(pre-Russ) time window are percieved by him.

There is no "already".  So, it's wrong to state that "God _already_ 
knows what you will do."  That's a nonsense statement.  It makes no
sense.  God is time-independent.  But, none of that impacts whether
or not you can make decisions just like it doesn't impact whether
the universe is statistical or deterministic.

>> For a process (e.g. God) that is not time-dependent, having knowledge
>> of what will (1) or could (2) happen does not contradict the freewill
>> options of the time-dependent processes She observes.  By contrasting
>> God's omniscience and a human's freewill, you're comparing apples and
>> oranges.  They are _totally_ different.
>> 
rj> If it's only a "could", then he's not omniscient. He either knows or He 
rj> doesn't. If He knows, then I can't decide differently than what He 
rj> knows. How is that not mutually exclusive?

No.  "Could" implies a matrix of possibilities.  An entity can fully
_know_ everything about every path, including the possible paths.

It is true that he either knows X or he does not know X.  The assumption
of omniscience is that, if X exists, he knows X.

>> God's omnisicence does not contradict a human's freewill.
>> 
rj> Yes. It does. You stating that it doesn't does not make it so.

Just using a little tit-for-tat, there.  Sorry.  The more often you
repeat yourself, it makes others want to repeat themselves, too.
"Am not!" "Are too!" "Am not!"  ... pretty soon, we'll sound like
politicians.

>> Now, a human's omniscience would contradict a human's freewill.  Or,
>> God's omniscience would contradict God's freewill.  But, that's not
>> what you're talking about.  You're relating time-dependent humans to
>> time-independent God.  Hence you haven't demonstrated any such
>> contradiction.
>> 
rj> It makes no difference WHO is omniscient. We're still talking about 
rj> knowing everything, all at once. Past, future, present, it's all 
rj> irrelevant to an omniscient being. So, the mear existance of this 
rj> omniscient being negates free will.

It does make a difference.  "Free will" is nonsense without change.
And change is nonsense without a concept of time (or some monotonic
parameter through which change is effected).  For example, if
something cannot be different between t_i and t_(i+1), then it's
nonsense to say that a decision can be made between t_i and t_(i+1).
Free will requires time.

Omniscience requires time-independence.  You cannot be governed or
limited by an _independent_ variable like time if you are omniscient.
Let's say there's an entity O that is omniscient.  If 

  (1)   O = f(t), then O is time-dependent.

That means that 

   (2)  O|t+1 != O|t 

(by contradiction, for if it were, then f(t+1) = f(t) => O != f(t)).

But, if O is omniscient, then it somehow contains or knows what will
happen at t+1 _already_ at t, then we'd have something like 

   (3)  O|t contains O|t+1.  

And if O is omniscient, then, at t+1, it somehow contains or knows
what happened at t, giving us something like 

   (4)  O|t+1 contains O|t

(3) and (4) imply

   (5)  O|t+1 = O|t

And, therefore, O is _not_ a function of time.  Hence, assuming O is
omniscient _and_ assuming O is time-dependent leads us to a
contradiction.... which means one of the assumptions must be false.

So, omniscience and time-dependence are mutually exclusive.  That means
that if humans are time-dependent, they cannot be omniscient.  But, 
since God is not time-dependent, it can be omniscient.

rj> Now, you say God has no freewill? I think some theologians would argue 
rj> with you on that one.

No.  I simply said that, by logic, God's omniscience would contradict
God's freewill.  Theologians get around this by simply saying that the
logic is inadequate to deduce things about God.  And I agree.  What
I've deduced above simply shows that there is a categorical order to
the two contexts.  Things in the category time-independent are of
higher order (fewer parameters) than time-dependent ones.  And the
theologians would accept that as a matter of course.  God is more
mysterious than humans.  That's not news. [grin]

>> Please don't just repeat yourself this time.  Make some sort of effort
>> to actually demonstrate the contradiction you claim.
>> 
rj> I can't help that you can not see the simple logic in my argument.

The problem is that I _do_ see your simple claim (you didn't use any
logic).  And you're wrong.  If you weren't wrong, I wouldn't be
arguing with you. [grin]

The burden of proof is on you.  You made the claim that God's
omniscience and man's freewill are mutually exclusive concepts.  And
I've made a quite complete argument, using logic, that they are not
mutually exclusive.  If you really want to argue the point, then show
(by deduction, abduction, or induction) me the contradiction.  Belief
doesn't count.

-- 
glen e. p. ropella              =><=                           Hail Eris!
H: 503.630.4505                              http://www.ropella.net/~gepr
M: 971.219.3846                               http://www.tempusdictum.com